Kampala is the capital city of Uganda and one of the largest and economically most important cities in East Africa. It is the country’s financial and economic centre, the official seat of government power and close neighbour to Entebbe, where the president sits; it therefore forms a key part of the axis where key political settlements and alignments are forged. With a small if growing industrial base, the city is spatially characterised by a high level of underserviced auto-constructed neighbourhoods alongside a vibrant informal economy for transport, trade, recycling and smaller business.

Kampala’s uneven spatial development is shaped by a distinctly complex governance arrangement, with colonial legacies leaving a bifurcated landholding system layered with more recent efforts at centralising urban governance through the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA). Urban development is further shaped by a rich tradition of civil society and community organising in response to state neglect, including mutual aid networks, development of alternative infrastructure arrangements, and political manoeuvring for more inclusive urban development from below. There are also a range of university-based and other civil society knowledge centres that take an active part in urban policy discussions.

**URBAN CONTEXT**

Kampala City was established as a municipality in 1947 and became the capital city of Uganda at independence in 1962.1 Bordering on Lake Victoria and surrounded by a series of hills, the city covers an area of 189km², of which 19km² is water. The city is divided into five urban divisions: Central, Kawempe, Makindye, Lubaga and Nakawa. Surrounding the city are several other municipal jurisdictions that rely on their proximity to Kampala for economic activity, and some now include closer-lying towns, such as Mukono and Entebbe, in the urban functional area. Thus, while there are around 1.8 million residents of Kampala City, it is estimated that 3.5 million people enter the city for employment every day. Much of this relates to the informal sector, accounting for around 1.5 million jobs.2 Taken as a whole, Kampala is one of the most rapidly growing urban regions on the continent, with a recorded population growth rate for the City alone of 5% per year between 1995 and 2015.3 Because of regional and civil warfare, the city also hosts large populations of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs).4 Although Kampala currently has a limited industrial base, there are reports of increasing inflow of international investment, in particular Chinese, promoting a possible return of more steady industrialisation.5

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1 GCR (2015).
2 Ibid.
3 Vermeiren et al. (2016).
4 Monteith and Lwasa (2017).
5 Goodfellow and Huang (2021).
Box 1: Kampala City – Summary

- Capital city of Uganda
- Hosts the seat of government
- Economic gateway and showcase of Uganda
- 1.75 million residents and working environment for an estimated daily workforce of 3.5 million
- Annual population growth rate of 3.9%
- A primate city in all significant economic fields
  - Contributes approximately 65% of Uganda’s GDP and accounts for 80% of its industrial output and commercial activity
  - Has a dynamic informal sector; 55% of all Uganda’s microenterprises are located in the city
  - 71% of all informal sector employment is in trade, while 23% and 6% of employment is in manufacturing and services, respectively
  - 40% of undeveloped land in the city is utilised for crop production
- 2010 – Central government took over the management of the city
- 2011 – Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) became a government agency

Sources: GCR (2015) and KCCA (2015)

HISTORY OF THE CITY AND TOWN PLANNING

The hills and marshes of present-day Kampala were settled by the Buganda kingdom in 1884 on Mengo Hill,\(^6\) partly because of its strategic location close to Nalubaale lake (renamed Lake Victoria by colonialists). Historically, the Kabakas (kings) of Buganda created around their hilltop palaces a Kibuga, a settlement of thousands of followers, moving it every few years to another hilltop, due to ants and rot (see Figure 1). When British colonialists arrived in 1890 and placed a fort on Old Kampala Hill, facing the palace of Kabaka Mutesa I across Kisenyi valley on Mengo Hill, the basis of Kampala was established.\(^7\)

These colonial legacies have shaped a bifurcated land regulation system in Kampala that still conditions urban land use. When the Uganda Protectorate in 1894 was proclaimed by British colonial forces to protect imperial trade routes, the Kabaka and Bagandan elites negotiated a special standing for themselves within the system of indirect colonial rule.\(^8\) This created a bifurcated land-administrative system in Kampala: the Kabaka and country chiefs were given mailo land that could not be taxed (so-called allodial land); and “Crown land” was kept by the colonial office.\(^9\) This came to underpin an uneven spatial process of urbanisation with a better-serviced “European” city and an underserviced section for Africans.

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\(^6\) Omolo-Okalebo (2011); see also Gutkind (1960, 1963); Southall and Gutkind (1957).
\(^7\) Weeks (1962).
\(^8\) Mamdani (1996).
\(^9\) Byerley (2019). The word mailo seems to derive from the English word “miles” and the colonial custom of measuring land plots in square miles.
Each parcel of land was under control of a Chief, under the Kabaka. When Europeans first arrived in the 1870s, they were struck by the settlement’s fortifications and orderly spatial organisation and the kingdom’s political and military sophistication.\textsuperscript{10}


The advent of the Kenya–Uganda railway (1896 to 1931) strengthened the city as an administrative-military centre for colonial domination and resource extraction and spurred its growth. A first urban planning scheme appeared in 1912\textsuperscript{11} and in 1948 there were 24,000 inhabitants, which put pressure on centrally lying mailo land and challenged “colonial aspirations for modern orderly urban planning”.\textsuperscript{12} With independence in 1962, there were attempts at modernist planning, involving a United Nations Mission, amongst other initiatives. However, the comprehensiveness of these Eurocentric plans was increasingly difficult to finance, especially after 1971, when Idi Amin’s military government undermined the city’s revenue base.\textsuperscript{13} Prolonged periods of political instability and civil conflict from the 1970s until the early 2000s, overlapping with regional conflicts and instability since the 1990s, have made Kampala a home for a large refugee population.\textsuperscript{14}

Over the years, the unplanned sprawl of Kampala outstripped the capacity of the city infrastructure to support the delivery of effective public services. Along with infrastructural constraints there was an element of mismanagement, and poor city governance manifested in low levels of adherence to rules and regulations, leading to corruption and fraud. Following a lengthy debate and consultative process to reform the post-independence governing of Kampala from traditional and colonial structures, in 2010 parliament created the Kampala Capital City Authority.\textsuperscript{15} This placed the city’s administration as an entity under the central government, which has also been interpreted as a way for the ruling party to influence the capital, which it had lost to the opposition in 1998.\textsuperscript{16} This has

\begin{itemize}
\item Byerley (2019).
\item Omolo-Okalebo et al. (2010); see also Terreni Brown (2014).
\item Byerley (2019); see also Omolo-Okalebo et al. (2010).
\item Omolo-Okalebo (2011), p.69.
\item Monteith and Lwasa (2017).
\item KCCA (2014).
\item Goodfellow (2019).
\end{itemize}
turned Kampala into a highly politicised urban setting, where political configurations from national to city level interact to subvert broader systems of city governance.\textsuperscript{17}

**URBAN CHALLENGES**

Today, Kampala is faced with enormous challenges, due to the low socioeconomic conditions of many of its residents and those of the surrounding districts (see Box 1 and Figure 2). This hampers economic growth nationally and even regionally, since Kampala is the country’s commercial and economic hub and a key centre and driver in the Great Lakes Region.\textsuperscript{18} The city contributes approximately 60\% of Uganda’s GDP and accounts for 80\% of the country’s industrial sector. The majority of working adults in Kampala work in the services sector and sales (46\%), and around 15\% in the construction industry.\textsuperscript{19} Kampala has the highest rate of unemployment of all sub-regions, with 21\% of the labour force recorded as unemployed in the 2016/17 national household survey\textsuperscript{20} – the majority being women and youths. Compared to the nation, though, only 2.6\% of the city’s households fall below the national poverty line (up from 0.7\% recorded in 2012/13), compared with 21.4\% nationally.\textsuperscript{21}

Additionally, Kampala faces a major infrastructure challenge, following years of neglect and underinvestment, that has been further hampered by fragmented land use. Only around 23\% of Kampala’s area is considered fully urbanised, with access to a full range of municipal services. The bulk of the area (around 60\%) is semi-urbanised and comprises 62 informal settlements, housing an estimated 560,000 families. The remainder of land area is still considered rural. The poor socioeconomic conditions have placed significant pressure on the city’s services and revenue streams, which has contributed to a deterioration of infrastructure such as roads, schools and hospitals.\textsuperscript{22}

The response to urban growth and the infrastructure backlog has been (as in the rest of the country) the formation of a dynamic and growing urban informal sector. The informal sector is by far the most important employer in Uganda. It is estimated that more than 1.5 million microenterprises operate in the country, employing over 2.5 million people, with over 55\% located in Kampala. Outside farming, the informal sector could be employing up to 90\% of all workers and its contribution to GDP has been estimated at 20\%, evidencing its impact at urban and national level. Most are working in trade, which captures 72\% of the informal sector employment, followed by manufacturing, 23\%, and services, 6\%. The most significant informal activities include transport (using boda-bodas and taxis/matatus), markets, street vending, hawking and wholesale and retail sale trade and commerce in consumables, plastics, textiles, among others.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} KCCA (2014).
\textsuperscript{19} Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2020).
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} GCR (2015).
\textsuperscript{23} KCCA (2014).
The informal or self-constructed economy not only provides livelihoods, but also extends infrastructure services beyond the official and centrally planned grid. Recent ethnographic research has evidenced how the practices, skills and organisation of the informal economy interact with formal institutions to shape how transport, water, electricity and sanitation are provided to the majority across the city. This "heterogenous infrastructure" landscape consists of multiple actors, land uses and modalities of operation, and while informalisation cripples the city’s ability to generate revenues for new investments, the viability of the informal economy and its contribution to infrastructure services represent a crucial value to safeguard. The challenge lies in identifying urban planning modes and reform coalitions that can find ways to integrate or sustain the informal economy while also providing more stable incomes and safe jobs, and revenue streams for the city.

POLITICAL CONTEXT

National politics operates to a large extent through the capital city of Kampala and its close neighbour, Entebbe. Recent analysis of the city’s political context has revealed the dynamic and possibly unstable nature of the political settlement that shapes decision-making. The ruling coalition of Uganda, those tied to the National Resistance Movement (NRM) led by President Museveni since victory in the civil war in 1986, have distributed urban land in Kampala as "side payments" to...
“accommodate a relatively diffuse distribution of power” nationally. Urban land has functioned as a political resource so that private profits can be made on urban land, in exchange for political or economic support. This includes leaders of the Buganda Kingdom, larger business players and senior state bureaucrats, but also important powerbrokers in the extensive informal economy of the city, such as informal market operators, transport syndicates and informal settlement community leaders.

This informalising dynamic of land use decision-making thus operates at multiple levels, in ways that reflect the nature of Uganda’s political settlement. It involves efforts by the ruling coalition to secure support from other elites and populous low-income groups, whilst offsetting the potential opposition of middle classes through a relaxed approach to land use regulations. In part it explains the increasing fragmentation of land use in the last 20 years, with luxury hotels, the loss of parks and green space, and large informal marketplaces. Historically, this informalisation and decentralisation of land regulation was strengthened from the 1990s, when international donors such as the World Bank pushed for government decentralisation—a mode of governance that the NRM coalition had already embraced as part of their system of “no-party” democracy. This in turn led opposition figures entering the Kampala City Council (KCC) to compete in providing “urban land-based side payments” to challenge the ruling coalition. The formation of the KCCA was intended to re-centralise urban governance and offer national government greater control over the capital city, thereby reducing the scope for the elected political opposition in Kampala to use urban land to increase their support. Based on this, scholars have suggested that Uganda exemplifies the multiscalar character of political settlements, with the historic concentration of power around President Museveni’s ruling coalition becoming highly contested within the context of Kampala.

**AFRICAN CITIES RESEARCH CONSORTIUM: POTENTIAL ADDED VALUE**

Given its economic centrality in East Africa, Kampala offers an important context for investigating the political economy of African cities and urban regions. With its vibrant recent history of grassroots and community organising, alongside strong knowledge and research networks, Kampala provides an opportunity for ACRC to do impactful research with partners into urban inclusive policies and reforms. The city boasts a long intellectual tradition that will facilitate ACRC’s aim of grounded analysis. To Kampala’s combination of knowledge, archives and policy networks, ACRC will add value by collaborating with partners to develop research that further addresses the systemic and political nature of urban problems.

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30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Carbone (2003), p.485. A hegemonic “no-party” democracy is when “political organizations are allowed a minimal presence so long as they do not constitute an effective challenge to the ruling [NRM] Movement organization”.
33 Goodfellow (2018). For more on political settlements in Kampala, see Goodfellow and Jackman (2020) and Muwanga, Mukwaya and Goodfellow (2020).
REFERENCES


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