By Tom Gillespie and Baraka Mwau

On 25 June 2024, the streets of Nairobi erupted in protest against the government of Kenya’s plans to increase taxes on many everyday goods, such as food and fuel. President William Ruto’s controversial 2024 Finance Bill was a response to Kenya’s ongoing fiscal crisis, with infrastructure debt financing playing a central role in motivating tax hikes.

The world watched on in shock as protestors occupied the Kenyan Parliament building and the police responded with indiscriminate and deadly use of tear gas and live ammunition. The Finance Bill was subsequently scrapped in response to overwhelming popular pressure, with Kenya’s tech-savvy youth assuming a particularly visible role in the unrest.

While the Finance Bill was the immediate trigger for what some have labelled the “Gen-Z” uprising, the anti-government protests indicate a turn towards anti-elite class politics motivated by persistent economic inequality in Kenya.

Drawing on our recently published research on the relationship between road building, urbanisation and rentier capitalism in Nairobi Metropolitan Region, we argue that the inequality that provoked these protests has an important urban geographical dimension that is easily overlooked in debates about class, ethnic and generational politics.

Infrastructure-led development and urbanisation

Ruto’s proposed tax hikes were a condition of a loan taken from the International Monetary Fund in response to Kenya’s ongoing sovereign debt crisis. This crisis is, in part, a product of the infrastructure-led development approach adopted by previous governments under the banner of Kenya’s Vision 2030 national development strategy. In particular, Uhuru Kenyatta’s 2013-2022 Jubilee government borrowed heavily from international funders for large-scale transport infrastructure projects, such as the Chinese-financed and built Standard Gauge Railway.

While Vision 2030 infrastructure projects have contributed to Kenya’s escalating debt burden, they have thus far failed to deliver on their promise of catalysing national economic prosperity. Rather, Kenyan workers struggle to navigate an adverse economic situation characterised by irregular incomes, rising living costs and growing indebtedness to mobile lending platforms. Meanwhile, successive governments have failed to initiate targeted debt repayment mechanisms, such as capturing increases in land value due to public infrastructure investments. Instead, infrastructure debt repayments are taken from the general revenue generated in the country.

While a fair distribution of the economic benefits of infrastructure-led development have failed to materialise, road building projects have animated peri-urbanisation processes on Nairobi’s fringes, by opening up new territories to real estate speculation. Our research examined the impact of two Vision 2030 road projects on urbanisation dynamics in Nairobi: the “Superhighway”, connecting the capital to the town of Thika to the north, and the Eastern Bypass, linking this new highway to the international airport to the south. These initiatives received funding from the African Development Bank and China’s Exim Bank and were constructed by Chinese contractors between 2009 and 2023.

Our research found that the Thika Superhighway and Eastern Bypass projects have catalysed a peri-urban property boom, in which huge swathes of agricultural and ranching land have been subdivided into valuable plots of urban real estate. As a result, dense urban neighbourhoods dominated by high-rise rental housing have emerged along the route of these road corridors.

Rentier capitalism and class power

It is well established that the costs of public borrowing for infrastructure projects have been borne by Kenya’s taxpayers through austerity policies and tax increases. However, studying Nairobi’s urban geography reveals who the primary beneficiaries of these projects are. Road building in Nairobi has enabled the geographical expansion of rentier capitalism – accumulation through the extraction of rents from scarce land assets. This rentier capitalist expansion has enhanced the class power of politically connected elites in two ways.

First, individuals and land buying/selling firms with connections to politicians and government officials are often notified of confirmed road investments before they are announced to the public. This allows them to buy out existing landowners, such as smallholders or the shareholders of group farms. Land is then subdivided into plots which are sold for a significant profit once the roads are built.

Second, wealthy landlords have increased land rents by constructing high-rise tenements and flats on small plots of land near new roads, often in violation of planning and building regulations. Although ownership of some of these properties is opaque, it is widely suspected that well-connected individuals, including politicians, civil servants and senior business people own multiple blocks of highly profitable rental accommodation.

While the costs of Kenya’s infrastructure-led development strategy have been offloaded onto the public, therefore, Vision 2030 road building projects have reinforced the class power of the political and economic elite, by enabling them to engage in the appropriation of land rents. High-rise landlordism enables this elite to extract value from the 86% of households in Nairobi and its satellite towns that live in rental accommodation. As such, urbanisation and rentier capitalist expansion in Nairobi have reinforced the stark inequality that contributed to Kenya’s recent anti-government protests.

Land and the politics of inequality

The politics of inequality in Kenya has been intimately tied to land ownership since British settler colonial dispossession provoked the Mau Mau uprising in the 1950s. Furthermore, the 2004 Ndung’u report on elite land grabbing revealed the extent to which connections to political office have shaped the accumulation of property since independence. It is this amassing of land wealth that has enabled Kenya’s elite to capitalise on road building projects in peri-urban Nairobi.

Kenya’s propertied elite has historically relied on the politics of ethnic clientelism to divide the population and maintain their dominance. However, the failure of infrastructure-led development to generate broad-based prosperity has contributed to the emergence of an anti-elite populism, in which class, rather than ethnicity, is the primary reference point. Within this context, the recent protests represent the rejection of not just a particular bill or government, but Kenya’s highly unequal postcolonial political economy.

The scrapping of the Finance Bill raises the question of how best to expand Kenya’s tax base. While protestors have rejected further taxes on incomes or consumption, the possible use of land value capture mechanisms (beyond simply taxing rental income) deserves further exploration. Property taxation is very limited in many African cities, and increases in land value due to public infrastructure investments are typically appropriated by private actors, such as speculators and landlords. Capturing some of this value to fund public spending and investment would be a progressive alternative to further squeezing the collective incomes of ordinary Kenyans. Furthermore, it would address one of the root causes of inequality by reining in the economic power of the propertied elite.

Read the full, open access article:

• Road Corridors as Real Estate Frontiers: The New Urban Geographies of Rentier Capitalism in Africa

Header photo credit: Wirestock / iStock. Globe Roundabout in Nairobi, Kenya.

Note: This article presents the views of the authors featured and does not necessarily represent the views of the African Cities Research Consortium as a whole.

The African Cities blog is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0), which means you are welcome to repost this content as long as you provide full credit and a link to this original post.

By Rosebella Apollo, Jerry Okal and Jack Makau

Kenya has recently witnessed a unique series of protests, distinct from typical political demonstrations. These protests, known locally as “Maandamano”, have transcended regional, political, ethnic, social, and economic boundaries in Kenya. They reflect a growing concern among Kenyans about the high cost of living, persistent governance issues, corruption, foreign debt and an increasing inflation rate.

The country’s escalating debt and its impact on service delivery and the economy have been a major worry. Despite various unsustainable measures and coping strategies, Kenyans have quietly continued to bear the burden of unpopular political decisions. The ruling class and elites have taken advantage of this silence to push through unpopular legislation and rulings, making the economic situation even more dire.

Rising above the repression

A few months ago, the reality of Kenyans rising against punitive economic challenges seemed farfetched – let alone the idea of young people being able to meaningfully organise and participate in political processes. However, the contested Finance Bill of 2024 triggered unforeseen countrywide demonstrations to protest the finance bill, a punitive piece of legislation which sought to raise revenue of KES 3.7 trillion through taxation and acquisition of additional public debt.

Unlike the long history of the political elite-led demonstrations, the nationwide protests were led and headed predominantly by young people, known as Generation Z (Gen-Z) – those born in the late 90s and early 2000s – who demanded rejection of the finance bill. Over time, these demands evolved to decry the state of corruption, escalating public debt, accountability, impunity, incompetence, cronyism and wastage of public resources in both the executive and legislative arms of government.

Technology as a positive disruptor and an organising tool

The recent Gen-Z protests in Kenya have led to various outcomes and repercussions, including the rejection of the 2024 Finance Bill, changes in the cabinet secretaries, dissolution of 47 cooperatives, suspension of re-appointments in the civil service, and the abolishment of unconstitutional offices.

But what are the implications of these events for Kenya and the African continent as a whole? 

Firstly, the youth have challenged the established political order and tested the traditional political settlement theories that suggest power is primarily held by political elites. These events in Kenya could potentially lead to a shift in political power and the onset of a “co-shared political power” era of governance and public scrutiny on the affairs of the state.

Secondly, Gen-Z has redefined the organisation and conduct of protests. By using technology, especially social media to coordinate and validate their concerns, garner support from allies – including millennials and civil society – as well as communicate and orchestrate peaceful nationwide protests, they have reshaped the negative perception often associated with protests involving violence and destruction.

A sense of deepened accountability

The elite have long taken advantage of young people to further their own agendas. In the past, politicians used the youth majorly to win elections and cause disruptions for their own selfish gains. However, the recent Gen-Z protests signal a shift. Young people are no longer apathetic to political processes – they are politically aware and are willing to self-organise and rally support for issues that directly impact their future.

As seen in these ongoing protests, Gen-Z consistently raises valid concerns, supported by evidence, and proposes solutions. This pressure from the younger generation is pushing the government to increase transparency, accountability and improve service delivery.

Beyond the youth, we can expect to see other interest groups – such as registered professional bodies, university student organisations, organised civil society and human rights groups – rising to boldly and decisively challenge the status quo demand change. These actions are helping to open up the civic space, giving people a voice and agency.

Challenging dominant power configurations

The traditional political base in Kenya has been largely organised along tribal lines, with tribal alliances playing a key role in forming the ruling leader’s block. However, recent events, including the Gen-Z protests, suggest a shift towards issue-based politics that transcends ethnicity and emphasises the push for change.

The Gen-Z protesters have presented themselves as tribeless, leaderless and partyless, making it challenging for the ruling class to engage with and quell the protests. In response to relentless pursuits from peaceful Gen-Z protestors, the Kenyan police force resorted to using excessive force, brutal crackdowns, abductions and detentions, leading to at least 50 fatalities.

In the face of threats and deaths, the young people have been resilient and focused on their demands for greater accountability by the government. If this trend continues, it may lead to significant changes in power dynamics, challenging the dominance of tribal kingpins and other leadership figures. It is also becoming increasingly apparent that power ultimately belongs to the people, highlighting the need for political and ruling elites to strike a balance between serving the electorate’s aspirations and pursuing their own interests.

A young man holds a Kenyan flag at a protest in Nairobi

Leading the way for other African youth to challenge the status quo

Since the historic protests began in mid-June, 2024 the rest of the continent has been closely following the Gen-Z protests. The challenges that triggered Kenya’s wave of protests are experienced in other African nations, and youthful voices are being heard across the continent – through movements such as #EndBadGovernance and End SARS in Nigeria, protests against corruption and human rights abuses in Uganda, and #FeesMustFall in South Africa, among others.

Plans for protests are slowly percolating in different forms and shapes. Inspired by the recent protests in Kenya, which led to President William Ruto declining to sign the Finance Bill 2024 and implementing significant government reforms, Nigerian youths took to social media to call for change in their own country. A series of protests by the Gen Z youths in August, 2024 to demanded better governance from the ruling administration.

Beyond Africa, there were recent protests in Bangladesh led by young university students. The protesters were opposing the reinstatement of a quota that reserves 30% of government jobs for children of independence war veterans, which they argue favours supporters of the ruling party. The protests were intense and eventually led to the Prime Minister fleeing the country.

Given the prevailing circumstances of each country’s civic space, it is likely that more youth will attempt to use demonstrations as a way of igniting political activism – expressing their dissatisfaction and raising their voices to address critical issues that negatively impact their lives.

In Africa, young people in their numbers are an invaluable strategic resource. As rapid urbanisation and youth bulge continue to proliferate the African continent, there is a need to find more practical ways of including traditionally marginalised youth in co-creating urban transformation initiatives, to provide opportunities and harness the benefits associated with a youthful demographic.

> Read more about the challenges facing young people in African cities in our youth and capability development domain report

Photo credits: Sarah Ouma / SDI-Kenya. The header photo shows a young woman holding a placard at a protest in Nairobi.

Note: This article presents the views of the authors featured and does not necessarily represent the views of the African Cities Research Consortium as a whole.

The African Cities blog is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0), which means you are welcome to repost this content as long as you provide full credit and a link to this original post.