By Adewumi Badiora, ACRC Lagos action research lead and senior lecturer in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning at Olabisi Onabanjo University

Nigeria is urbanising at a remarkable speed. Some of the world’s fastest growing cities are in the west African country.

With the current rate of urbanisation, Kano, Ibadan, Abuja and Port Harcourt will surpass the 10 million inhabitants mega city threshold by 2050. According to United Nations estimates, Lagos will be the largest city in the world by 2100, accommodating more than 88 million people, up from the present population of about 25 million.

The rapid urbanisation and other issues, such as climate change, limited public finance and extreme poverty, are putting pressure on the government to provide better basic public infrastructure, especially in informal settlements.

Streetlighting is one area of public infrastructure where there is a clear need, and potential, for improvement.

Streetlighting plays a crucial role in public safety and security, and it promotes inclusive social and economic development by boosting local commerce, street businesses and community engagement.

Conventional grid-based streetlights and other technologies like LED lights powered by solar energy have been installed in parts of Nigeria but are still lacking in many cities.

I have been researching various aspects of urban and community safety in Nigeria, particularly in the country’s south-west. I currently lead the African Cities Research Consortium safety and security domain action research in Lagos.

I co-authored a recent research report about the condition of streetlights in Lagos. I interviewed 17 key informants in a bid to understand the provision, challenges, quality and impact of streetlighting in Africa’s foremost mega city. Respondents included residents and community associations, state agencies, private sector companies, and nongovernmental agencies.

We found that streetlight provision by the state has been orientated towards elite neighbourhoods, while households in disadvantaged settlements have less access.

Nevertheless, low-income communities across the city have come together to drive progress. They have enabled residents to achieve some level of streetlight infrastructure in their neighbourhood by working with the local government, civil society organisations and NGOs.

We argue that solutions will only be found through inclusive engagements that push against established approaches to infrastructure development.

Multiple paybacks of streetlighting

Research was conducted in three selected communities: Ilaje-Bariga on the Mainland, Brazilian Quarters on the Island and Ajegunle-Ikorodu in the peri-urban area. The three communities have either past or ongoing streetlight projects being delivered via sponsorship or collaboration between the Community Development Association, state or nonstate institutions.

Economic and social benefits were particularly prominent. Residents feel safer going out after dark when streets are well lit, while workers feel safer walking to and from their homes early in the morning and at night.

Businesses on newly lit streets have seen increased revenue as a result of vendors and traders being able to operate for longer after nightfall.

A previous case study established that extending trading times beyond daylight hours could add tens of thousands of working hours daily to the economy.

A respondent commented: “Policing work is now better in the night and we do not need to rely on battery-powered torchlight while on street patrol or checks.”

Another added: “We used to have cases of robbery, but the streetlight makes everywhere lit like daytime … the hoodlums are no longer able to perpetrate their act.”

Hurdles of streetlight provisions

Some obstacles remain, however. Our research uncovered many reasons as to why streetlight projects are not long-lasting or are unsuccessful. Limited budgeting and politically driven procurement are key challenges.

We found that the high costs and limited state budgets mean that certain areas of the city are prioritised and other areas neglected. The ruling class receives more political and economic support.

Across the three communities researched, the average cost of installation of one solar streetlight pole is USD 200-800, compared to USD 1,150 for a conventional grid powered streetlight. The difference in operating costs is where the economics of solar powered, compared to conventional, streetlighting becomes most compelling.

Politically driven procurement spotlights the need to favour cronies on the selection, awarding and implementation of streetlight infrastructure. Projects are awarded in favour of individuals (usually party members and not necessarily an expert) in exchange for political support.

The lack of technical expertise at the local and state levels remains a critical barrier, according to our study. This is displayed in poor procurement processes, infrastructure maintenance issues and inefficient use of limited public funds.

Because of corruption, the full value of project allocation is rarely received by suppliers. As one respondent explained: “In most cases, the money allocated for projects does not get to us. There are bottlenecks here and there that will drain off most of the project fund.” This leaves limited capital to deliver quality infrastructure and streetlight projects are poorly delivered or abandoned before completion, for want of funds.

Other streetlighting projects are abandoned because succeeding regimes refuse to continue predecessor projects.

There is also the challenge of vandalism and theft involving streetlight equipment. There have been situations where “area boys” – Lagos street gangs – restricted streetlight installation and where equipment parts were stolen.

Overcoming the obstacles

The solutions can only be found through inclusive engagements. Our study recommends the following steps:

• Involve a wide range of players, particularly local communities, in planning and delivering streetlighting.
• Build an enabling environment for private-sector-led renewable solutions and investment in sustainable lighting technologies, such as LED lights.
• Create a robust regulatory framework to produce sustainable lighting technologies locally.
• Improve state budget and investment funding for streetlighting.
• Develop capacity in the public sector to plan, design, finance and deliver projects.
• Support low-income neighbourhoods and informal communities.
• Separate political, personal interests from good governance and ensure transparency in the procurement process in practice.

So far, the large-scale initiative involving the deployment of over 22,000 solar streetlights has engaged with residents in areas like Ikotun, Alausa, Ketu, Kosofe, Marina, Lekki and Surulere. Community feedback on the safety and environmental benefits has been integrated into the project. The project adopted LED lighting, which is more cost effective and energy efficient.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

By Adewumi Badiora, ACRC Lagos action research lead and senior lecturer in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning at Olabisi Onabanjo University

Criminal activities have developed into a security crisis in Nigeria. Alongside the responses of security agencies such as the police and military, there has been a huge local response, with community groups mobilising in the face of criminal attacks.

For example, communities in Zamfara State, north-west region, repelled a bandit attack, causing the death of 37 bandits in August 2024. In Sokoto State, north-west region, residents rescued kidnapped individuals and recovered the body of the deceased village head in August 2024. In Kwara state, north-central region, community groups rescued people from their abductors in December 2025.

But how effective are these community-organised interventions?

I’m an urban and community safety researcher who has studied various aspects of insecurity in Nigeria, particularly in the country’s south-west, for more than a decade now.

In a recent paper I sought to answer this question in relation to Lagos. As Nigeria’s largest city with an estimated population exceeding 20 million, Lagos faces severe, complex crime challenges driven by rapid, poorly managed urbanisation and high unemployment rates. I surveyed 62 stakeholders in a bid to evaluate community-driven crime prevention strategies. Respondents included residents, members of the state and community groups who were playing important roles in the city’s security processes. This was qualitative research.

Many respondents expressed little or no trust in formal security agencies. Their expectations that the police could protect them were low.

A resident interviewed for the study said that while people like politicians got police protection, ordinary citizens did not:

“That is why everyone has devised ways to protect themselves and family.”

My research found that these community-organised interventions have emerged in different forms. The commonest is community vigilante groups. These are self-appointed resident security volunteers who take it upon themselves to confront criminals in their neighbourhood. This is common in low-income neighbourhoods of Lagos because they have to deal with crime but feel they can’t rely on the police to patrol, unlike elite neighbourhoods.

A successful urban security strategy

Lagos community vigilante groups range from small groups of volunteers on streets, and informal neighbourhood watches, to well structured local community bodies. Community vigilante members are mostly men. But women are not explicitly excluded, and they are an important source of information.

The groups were using local knowledge to help the police. They compiled information on crimes, suspicious activity and criminal suspects in their area and provided it to the police as needed. In some cases, they joined the police intelligence response team to raid hideouts of criminals in their areas.

A resident interviewed for the study said:

“We are local people. We know our community very well. We can easily spot strangers and suspicious movements. This local knowledge is what we have, that the police do not have. So, we complement their efforts by providing dependable intelligence for their work. Beyond that, we also escort police patrol, and our presence has helped them to penetrate streets they would not have been able to navigate by themselves.”

The relationship between the police and community groups was “semi-formal”. Arrangements were made by the communities with little or no intervention by the state. The collaborations were owned, structured and sustained by residents.

Some of those involved in the groups were remunerated through financial contributions by residents. However, they “occasionally” received financial support from the local government authorities, individual local politicians and donors.

Successes

My research showed there had been some positive results. Residents confirmed that the collaborations brought safety to their community and had helped to reduce crime and insecurity, particularly where the police were lacking.

A resident interviewed for the study said:

“Things are a little better. Before now, it was dreadful as criminals and hoodlums operate openly. Although there is still a long way to go, there has been a commendable level of improvements in our security in the last five years.”

Some ongoing issues

Despite its success, several concerns were raised in my study.

First, community vigilante groups are a patchwork of isolated groups. Organisations are fragmented and weak. This could be dangerous because it creates unaccountable groups that can easily change from being protectors to being a threat. That can be seen in the Bakassi Boys (south-east Nigeria), Yan Sakai (north-west Nigeria) and global examples like Mungiki (Kenya) and Autodefensas (Mexico).

Second is the question of the legality of community groups in terms of the provisions of the Nigerian constitution, the Police Act and the Public Order Act. Their legal status is “complex” as they operate in a grey area. Most of them do not have the backing of the federal government, which has the constitutional authority to manage policies regarding them.

Third, while community vigilante groups fill security gaps created by an under-resourced police force, their activities sometimes lead to conflicts because they act as judge, jury and executioner.

A police officer interviewed for the study said:

“The activities of vigilantes are usually unlawful in the way and manner they deal with suspected criminals … The lawful thing for them is to report suspected criminals to the police, but many times, they take law into their own hands.”

Still, residents view the groups as legitimate because of their perceived effectiveness, deep local knowledge, community ties and quick action.

Fourth, relationships between community groups and the police range from amiable and collaborative to distrustful and hostile. Mutual distrust risks escalating violence rather than reducing it.

A member of a vigilante group put it this way:

“We cannot totally entrust suspects and our community to the police. We have situations where suspects were released without any investigation and prosecution. Not only that, corrupt police officers do give hints to these suspects about key vigilante members behind their arrests, and these criminals go all-out for them after their unlawful freedom from the police custody.”

Moving forward

To overcome the challenges, the following steps should be taken:

> Reform of Nigeria’s security governance, allowing states to create their own police forces;

> Formal recognition and support of community groups;

> Adopting policies to curb the proliferation of the groups;

> Working more closely with community groups to deal with some of the underlying reasons for insecurity. These include political negligence, youth unemployment, poverty and inequality.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Ville d’environ 1,3 million d’habitants située à l’est de la République démocratique du Congo (RDC), Bukavu est confrontée à des défis importants et complexes liés à la gouvernance, à la décentralisation, à l’urbanisation et à la gestion des ressources. La croissance rapide de la population, qui devrait doubler d’ici 2030 et tripler d’ici 2050, ne fait qu’exacerber les problèmes rencontrés par les habitants de la ville, en particulier ceux qui vivent dans des bidonvilles.

Dans un nouveau rapport de l’ACRC, Emery Mushagalusa Mudinga, Aymar Nyenyezi Bisoka et Philippe Mulumeoderhwa Kaganda examinent comment la politique et les systèmes urbains influencent et sont influencés par les défis du développement urbain à Bukavu dans divers domaines.

Menées entre 2022 et 2023, la recherche et l’analyse ne couvrent pas les faits nouveaux à Bukavu depuis que la ville est tombée sous le contrôle des rebelles de l’Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 Mars (AFC/M23) en février 2025. Cette nouvelle évolution du contexte politique pourrait faire l’objet d’études futures.

L’héritage de la colonisation et des conflits

Divisée en trois subdivisions administratives, appelées communes, et en 20 quartiers, Bukavu était un modèle de ségrégation urbaine dans les années 1950 à la suite de la colonisation belge et comportait des zones séparées pour les résidents blancs et noirs. Lorsqu’en 1960 la RDC accéda à son indépendance, l’évolution de la composition raciale de la ville fut accompagnée d’une détérioration urbaine progressive, accélérée par un afflux de réfugiés du génocide rwandais en 1994.

L’insécurité rurale associée aux opportunités économiques liées aux ressources minières a alimenté la croissance démographique, la construction de bidonvilles et la détérioration des conditions de vie dans la ville. Hormis le centre-ville, tous les quartiers de Bukavu et les zones environnantes abritent des populations à faibles revenus et défavorisées.

Comprendre la politique locale et nationale

Sur le plan politique, malgré la stabilité nationale depuis 2006, la gouvernance locale à Bukavu avant février 2025 reste marquée par le clientélisme et l’inefficacité. La décentralisation a été mise en œuvre en 2016 afin de fournir aux provinces les ressources nécessaires à une gestion efficace, mais ces efforts ont été entravés par les faibles taux de mise en œuvre des budgets provinciaux et les disparités au niveau de la répartition des ressources. Malgré la mise en œuvre de certaines initiatives visant à améliorer les conditions de vie et à légitimer l’État après 2019, les problèmes de gouvernance, de corruption et de gestion des ressources publiques persistent.

En tant que chef-lieu de la province du Sud Kivu, Bukavu a joué un rôle essentiel au niveau de l’arrangement politique national en raison de son rôle de centre de mobilisation politique. La dynamique du pouvoir dans la ville était marquée par des divisions ethniques, politiques, géographiques et professionnelles ; les élites locales étant en mesure d’influencer les négociations politiques au niveau central.

Relever des défis systémiques complexes

Bukavu est structurée en trois zones (le centre-ville, les quartiers populaires et les bidonvilles) et son urbanisation a largement dépassé les prévisions du plan de développement de 1957. Cette situation a entraîné une surpopulation et une utilisation inefficace des sols, avec un système de transport entravé par le mauvais état des routes et des infrastructures d’eau et d’énergie inadaptées à la population croissante de la ville. Les problèmes de violence urbaine et autres problèmes de sécurité touchent principalement les habitants des zones les moins développées. L’insécurité alimentaire est également élevée, plus de deux ménages sur cinq n’ayant pas accès à une alimentation saine.

L’incapacité des autorités municipales à gérer les systèmes de la ville a conduit de nombreux acteurs non étatiques, y compris des ONG, des leaders locaux et le secteur privé, à jouer un rôle croissant dans la fourniture des services essentiels, tels que l’eau, l’hygiène et l’assainissement, la sécurité et les transports. Cependant, cette multiplicité d’acteurs a également été source de confusion et de concurrence, sans pour autant améliorer le fonctionnement de ces services.

Nos études sur le développement urbain menées à Bukavu ont permis de dégager les principales conclusions suivantes :

La terre et la connectivité

La croissance démographique, largement alimentée par l’exode rural, a entraîné une augmentation de la demande de logements et de parcelles. La ville étant confinée dans une zone de seulement 60 km2, cela a conduit à la fragmentation des parcelles dans le centre et à la périphérie de la ville ainsi qu’à l’occupation par les habitants des zones rurales de terrains impropres à la construction. Les autorités ont créé de nouveaux quartiers pour tenter d’y remédier, mais sans développer ensuite les infrastructures adéquates, donnant ainsi lieu à un paysage urbain désordonné.

L’étude identifie huit défis majeurs dans ce domaine : la promiscuité de l’habitat dans les quartiers populaires ; la vulnérabilité des ménages à faible revenu face à la surenchère des prix de la terre et du loyer ; l’installation de plus de 60 % de la population sur des sites impropres à la construction (exposés aux risques d’affaissement, d’érosion et d’inondations) ; l’insécurité foncière ; les conflits liés à l’accaparement de la terre ; la mauvaise gestion préjudiciable des revenus fonciers ; l’obstruction ou l’inexistence de routes dans certains quartiers ; et l’enclavement de la ville, causée par un mauvais état des routes.

La sécurité et la sûreté

De nombreux facteurs ont contribué à l’insécurité de Bukavu au cours des dernières décennies, dont l’afflux de réfugiés à la suite du génocide de 1994 au Rwanda, la surpopulation résultant de l’exode rural, la persistance de groupes armés, l’émergence des groupes de sécurité locaux informels, l’insuffisance des salaires et les taux de chômage élevés, pour n’en citer que quelques-uns. La capacité et les moyens limités des forces de sécurité officielles, ainsi que les problèmes liés à l’utilisation des terres (comme les constructions anarchiques et la dégradation des infrastructures) ont également contribué à cette insécurité omniprésente.

Les quartiers situés dans les zones surpeuplées et sous-développées de Bukavu se sont révélés les plus touchés, l’insécurité y prenant généralement la forme d’une criminalité urbaine. Les lieux publics, y compris les marchés et les grandes places publiques, sont également des lieux d’insécurité permanente ou sporadique dans la ville. Si des associations locales de sécurité ont vu le jour dans certaines régions pour contribuer à résoudre ces problèmes, leur succès dépend de leur légitimité, de la couverture d’une zone géographique restreinte, du soutien matériel et financier des habitants et de l’efficacité de leurs dirigeants.

La santé, le bien-être et la nutrition

La détérioration continue des chaînes d’approvisionnement alimentaire a rendu difficile l’accès des habitants de Bukavu à une alimentation saine, en particulier pour les groupes vulnérables. Pas moins de 43 % des ménages de la ville étaient en situation d’insécurité alimentaire, principalement dans la commune d’Ibanda, où de nombreuses familles vivent dans la pauvreté et n’ont pas les moyens de se procurer une nourriture suffisante et saine. L’accès à l’eau potable fait également cruellement défaut.

Le coût élevé et l’accès limité à des produits alimentaires sains et de qualité ont entraîné une augmentation de la consommation d’aliments hautement transformés. Riches en graisses et en sucre, ces aliments transformés augmentent la prévalence des maladies non transmissibles, telles que l’obésité, le diabète et l’hypertension. La malnutrition des enfants, des femmes enceintes et des mères allaitantes constitue également un grave problème de santé publique.

Home to around 1.3 million people, Bukavu in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) faces significant and complex challenges related to governance, decentralisation, urbanisation and resource management. With the population expected to double by 2030 and triple by 2050, this rapid growth is only set to exacerbate the issues encountered by city residents – especially those living in informal settlements.

A new ACRC report by Emery Mushagalusa Mudinga, Aymar Nyenyezi Bisoka and Philippe Mulumeoderhwa Kaganda analyses how politics and urban systems shape – and are shaped by – these urban development challenges in Bukavu, across a range of domains.

Conducted between 2022-2023, the research and analysis do not cover developments in Bukavu since the city fell under the control of rebels from the Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 Mars (AFC/M23) in February 2025. This new development in the political context may be the subject of future studies.

Legacies of colonisation and conflict

Divided into three administrative subdivisions, known as “communes”, and 20 neighbourhoods, Bukavu was a model of urban segregation in the 1950s, as a result of Belgian colonisation, with separate areas for white and black residents. When DRC declared independence in 1960, the city underwent a transformation of its racial composition and a gradual urban deterioration – accelerated by an influx of refugees from the Rwandan genocide in 1994.

A combination of rural insecurity and economic opportunities – linked to mineral resources – has fuelled population growth, informal construction and worsening living conditions in the city. Apart from the city centre, all of Bukavu’s neighbourhoods and surrounding areas are home to low-income and disadvantaged populations.

Understanding city and national politics

Politically, despite national stability since 2006, local governance in Bukavu prior to February 2025 remained marked by clientelism and inefficiency. Decentralisation was implemented in 2016 to provide provinces with resources for effective management, but low implementation rates of provincial budgets and resource distribution disparities hampered these efforts. Although some initiatives aimed at improving living conditions and legitimising the state were rolled out after 2019, challenges around governance, corruption and public resource management persisted.

As the capital of South Kivu province, Bukavu was critical to the national political settlement because of its role as a centre of political mobilisation. City power dynamics were marked by ethnic, political, geographic and professional divisions, with local elites able to influence political negotiations at a central level.

Navigating complex systemic challenges

Divided into three zones – the city centre, working-class neighbourhoods and informal settlements – Bukavu’s level of urbanisation has far exceeded forecasts of the 1957 development plan. This led to overpopulation and inefficient land use, with a transport system hampered by poor road conditions, and water and energy infrastructure inadequate to serve the city’s growing population. Issues of urban violence and other security problems were found to mainly affect residents living in less developed areas, while food insecurity is also high, with more than two in five households lacking access to healthy food.

The inability of municipal authorities to manage the city’s systems led to multiple non-state actors – including NGOs, local leaders and the private sector – playing an increasing role in the provision of essential services such as water, hygiene and sanitation, security and transport. Yet this multiplicity of actors created confusion and competition, without improving functionality.

Key insights from the urban development domain studies undertaken in Bukavu include:

Land and connectivity

Population growth, largely fuelled by rural migration, led to increased demand for housing and land. With the city confined to an area of just 60km2, this led to the fragmentation of plots in the city centre and outskirts, and rural residents occupying land unsuitable for building. The authorities subdivided new neighbourhoods to try to deal with this, but without subsequent adequate infrastructure development, resulting in a disordered urban landscape.

The research identifies eight key challenges within this domain: overcrowded housing in working-class neighbourhoods; vulnerability of low-income households to rising land prices and rents; more than 60% residents living on sites unsuitable for construction (exposed to risks of subsidence, erosion and flooding); land tenure insecurity; conflicts linked to land grabbing; damaging mismanagement of land revenues; obstruction or absence of roads in certain neighbourhoods; and the city’s isolation, resulting from poor road maintenance.

Safety and security

Many factors contributed to the insecurity experienced by Bukavu over the last few decades, including the influx of refugees following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, overpopulation as a result of rural migration, the persistence of armed groups, the emergence of informal local security groups, inadequate salaries and high unemployment rates, to name a few. The limited capacity and capabilities within official security forces, along with issues related to land use – such as uncontrolled construction and deteriorating infrastructure – also contributed to this pervasive insecurity.

Neighbourhoods in overpopulated and underdeveloped areas of Bukavu were found to be most affected, where insecurity generally took the form of urban crime. Public places, including markets and large public squares, were also sites of permanent or sporadic insecurity in the city. While local security associations emerged in some areas to help address these issues, their success depended on them having legitimacy, covering a small geographic area, receiving material and financial support from residents, and having effective leadership.

Health, wellbeing and nutrition

Ongoing weakening of food supply chains made it difficult for Bukavu’s residents to access healthy food, especially for vulnerable groups. As many as 43% of households in the city were food insecure, mainly in the commune of Ibanda, where many families live in poverty and cannot afford sufficient, healthy food. There was also a severe lack of access to safe drinking water.

The high cost of and limited access to quality, healthy food items, along with a lack of time to prepare nutritious meals, led to increased consumption of highly processed foods. Rich in fats and sugars, these processed foods increase the prevalence of non-communicable diseases, such as obesity, diabetes and hypertension. Malnutrition among children and pregnant and breastfeeding women was also a serious public health problem.

Lagos is one of the fastest-growing cities globally, with a population of between 18 and 20 million and an annual growth rate of 6%. While rapid urbanisation has vastly outstripped the state’s capacity to provide adequate infrastructure, Lagos’s position as the commercial hub and economic powerhouse of Nigeria presents several development opportunities – despite its challenges.

A newly published ACRC report by Taibat Lawanson, Lindsay Sawyer and Damilola Olalekan explores the complex dynamics of contested political systems and their impact on the people of Lagos. Employing ACRC’s holistic framework, the authors integrate political settlements analysis, city system mapping and domain studies to provide a comprehensive overview of the city’s multifaceted urban development landscape.

Navigating the political landscape

Since its transition to electoral democracy in 1999, Nigeria has experienced relative political stability. However, party politics goes hand in hand with weak institutional capacity. Administratively, Lagos has overlapping jurisdictions across federal, state and local governments, with traditional rulers, trade unions and community-based associations also playing vital roles.

Lagos has been shaped by conflicting rationalities of development. Political and economic entanglements result in unequal urban outcomes, which tend to favour some portions of society above others. On one hand, the government, along with political and economic elites, shape city dynamics – largely for their own benefit. On the other, the rest of the city – mostly comprised of informal actors or informal settlement residents – negotiate access to city resources for their own survival. So while elites are largely united behind a “megacity” vision of transforming Lagos into a premier investment destination, this leads to the state clashing with informal settlement residents and traders – such as through forced evictions, clearing informal settlements and banning certain modes of informal transport.

Identifying opportunities to bolster city systems

The research found that systemic deficiencies in Lagos are largely due to the inability of the state to provide for the city’s vast and growing population. In the face of these challenging circumstances, non-state service providers step in to fill these gaps. City residents show resilience and innovation in coping with significant deficits in systems through both individual actions and community responses. Yet tensions occur when the state seeks to regulate these informal or private service providers, or gatekeep their activities. 

Energy poverty in Lagos is pervasive, impacting residents’ day-to-day lives. Unpredictable grid electricity means those who can afford it rely on diesel generators and invertors/battery storage. Yet this places further financial strain on individuals and businesses, as well as contributing to environmental pollution. Poor drainage and sanitation lead to frequent flooding and unsanitary living conditions. Although these issues affect all sections of society, accessibility to private providers often depends on income, further reinforcing inequalities.

Informality is extensive in Lagos, providing critical economic opportunities for low-income and marginalised residents. Of the state’s labour force of around 7.5 million, approximately three-quarters work in the informal economy – encompassing informal housing, transport, healthcare and other sectors. While the government tolerates much of this informal activity, it is frequently targeted for “clean ups” or removal as part of political campaigns and flexing of power.

Key findings from urban development domain studies

Safety and security

Crime, youth violence and police brutality are widespread in Lagos. The research identifies youth unemployment, inequality and worsened socioeconomic and living conditions as key enablers of insecurity in the city. Efforts to improve safety and security are undertaken by both state and non-state actors. In addition to various state agencies, including the police force, non-state and community efforts – such as community-based vigilante groups – have emerged to extend security provision in the city.

Lagos is also vulnerable to disasters and emergency incidents, such as flooding, fires, building collapses and road accidents. Intensifying rains as a result of climate change are exacerbating flooding, while the rise in sea level is also a severe threat to many city residents. Women, children and people with disabilities are especially at risk, with the city’s emergency infrastructure, capacity and planning currently insufficient to cope with these growing threats.

Housing

A crisis of affordable middle- and low-income housing from the formal public and private sectors means most Lagosians live in informal rental housing. These dwellings vary widely in condition, with landlords often demanding two years’ rent in advance – despite this being banned more than a decade ago. Mortgages are unavailable for those on low incomes, and allocation of state-built housing is often based on political patronage or affiliation.

Cooperative societies providing loans for procuring and developing assets could be key in the solution of affordable housing – and for building climate-resilient communities.

Structural transformation

As in many African cities, structural transformation has not kept up with rapid urbanisation in Lagos. While this urbanisation has brought a shift of labour from the agricultural sector, and rising services sector employment, it has had little effect on manufacturing.

Research findings show that inadequate infrastructure presents a challenge to structural transformation in Lagos – particularly regarding electricity provision, the transportation network, a hostile business environment and the problem of multiple taxation.

Neighbourhood and district economic development

With a predominantly informal economy, household microenterprises (HMEs), mainly run by women, are vital to the livelihoods of Lagos residents. These HMEs provide key services and goods to residents, including hairdressing, carpentry, food processing and vending.

Inadequate access to basic services and little or no access to credit for HMEs present significant challenges to their operation and growth.

Drawing on opportunities identified through the research and analysis, the authors identify various promising avenues for future research and action – highlighting the potential of urban reform coalitions, along with a need for civil service and local government reforms. The report concludes with a number of recommendations of areas for future research and priorities for policymakers and practitioners.

Across African cities, young people experience specific barriers to accessing livelihoods. This not only constrains their agency and ability to fulfil their aspirations but also creates environments in which they both perpetrate and experience violence. The form this violence takes largely varies by gender, along with other aspects of identity, including class, sexuality, ethnicity and migration/citizenship status.

A new crosscutting report by Katy Davis, Patience Adzande, Nicola Banks, Elizabeth Dessie, Olha Homonchuk, Wangui Kimari, Paula Meth, Sia Morenike Tengbe, Patience Mudimu-Matsangaise, Charity Mwangi, Teurai Anna Nyamangara, Martha Sibanda, Sally Theobald and Rachel Tolhurst examines this gendered youth–(in)security nexus in African cities.

While existing narratives around these issues can be reductive and binary – often labelling young men as “perpetrators” and young women as “victims” of violence – this report argues that deeper and more nuanced accounts of (in)security are needed. Shifting this narrative is key to developing strategies to improve the lives of young people, along with the safety and security of all African city residents.

The authors combine insights from existing literature with findings from ACRC research across three social domains – youth and capability development, safety and security, and health, wellbeing and nutrition. They draw on political settlements analysis to reveal how youth, gender and insecurity are closely intertwined with dynamic urban political processes and power relations that shape, and often constrain, opportunities for young people.

Three key dimensions emerge from the research:

1. Gendered marginalisation of urban youth – Transitions into young adulthood in African cities are diverse and non-linear. The processes of forming identities and social relationships are gendered and heavily influenced by these varying contexts. Against a landscape of poor economic growth, restricted educational opportunities and limited participation in politics and governance, young men are often expected to provide for their families, while all young people face gendered barriers to entering work. Although there are signs of young women contesting existing gender norms, there is limited research on female gender identity among urban African youth.

2. The making of (in)securities – Different forms of “security work” can provide livelihood opportunities for young men in African cities. Sometimes this is formal, but in many cases, young men organise to fill a void where state security services are absent. This work inevitably exposes them to violence – often perpetuating stereotypical and harmful narratives about young men being “radical” or “criminal”, while downplaying the agency of young women in these spaces. Although women are largely excluded from visible security work, they are often involved in less visible day-to-day work that helps keep themselves and their communities safe.

3. The gendered experiences of (in)security – Impacts of violence are also gendered, with some emerging forms of masculinity in African cities being expressed as gender-based violence. Threats of gender-based and sexual violence, particularly from formal and informal security forces, significantly impact the mobility of city residents – especially at night – in ways that vary by gender and other social positionalities.

The authors highlight the deep interconnectedness of these three themes, with sociopolitical contexts of African cities often leading to young men and women being marginalised in different ways and sometimes being drawn into various forms of (in)security as a means of fulfilling gendered social norms – paradoxically creating security for some and insecurity for others. They argue that employing a youth-gender-(in)security lens in urban development research, advanced by a lived experience methodology, can help to centre young people’s agency and counter harmful gender stereotypes.

Nairobi is central to the Kenyan economy, as a key political battleground and a hub for business networks and national and transnational trade. Yet it faces an increasingly complex set of socioeconomic, health and spatial inequalities.

A new report by Alice Sverdlik, Linda Nkatha Gichuiya, Zoltán Glück, Karuti Kanyinga, Wangui Kimari, Joshua Magero, Miriam Maina, George Michuki, Veronica Mwangi, Baraka Mwau, Inviolata Njoroge, Lilian Otiso and Samuel Owuor synthesises key insights from ACRC research on Nairobi’s urban development.

Exploring how national and city-level politics, urban systems and configurations of actors, agencies, ideas and practices have shaped Nairobi’s development, the report examines key challenges and emerging opportunities. It focuses on domains with potential to catalyse progressive interventions: safety and security; health, wellbeing and nutrition; housing; and structural transformation.

Lasting colonial legacies

Nairobi’s colonial legacy – as a settler capital marked by racial segregation and other divides – strongly shapes its politics and development today. Shelter provision and several underpinning systems remain biased in favour of colonial-era European areas, with many informal settlements (in areas designated as ‘African’) are still denied vital services. Militarised policing and criminalisation of low-income residents perpetuate colonial principles.

Shifting ethnic alliances, crony capitalism and competitive elections maintain a narrow elite in power. Cartels and other informal service providers often play a pivotal role, and their links to officials can make them difficult to dislodge.

Persistent developmental problems affect the wellbeing and life prospects of residents – particularly marginalised groups – and may also damage the environment. Poorly integrated, low-quality systems have major negative knock-on effects, especially for Nairobi’s low-income residents.

Challenges and emerging trends

The report explores Nairobi’s interrelated challenges, including inadequate services and infrastructure; minimal responsiveness to low-income citizens; and disjointed, exclusionary city planning efforts. Nearly all residents of Nairobi’s informal settlements live in poor-quality rental housing, and there has been a failure to regulate the city’s shelter or land markets.

Political alliances in Kenya are fluid and elite pacts are frequently remade. Nairobi’s local political leadership has often shown limited accountability and widespread use of patronage – hampering the delivery of critical services and infrastructure, especially in informal settlements. Nairobi also faces challenges around incomplete decentralisation, limited own-source revenue collection and underspending of revenues on development.

This lack of farsighted urban planning, compounded by fragmented agencies and few cross-sectoral interventions, has also led to challenges in addressing climate change. Nairobi’s major climate-related threats include heatwaves, water and food insecurity, and elevated risks of flooding, which have resulted in rising ill-health as well as forcible evictions.

Towards inclusive urbanisation pathways

Moving forward, the report’s authors argue that Nairobi’s planning systems need urgent reform to enable holistic approaches to rental housing, resilient infrastructure and inclusive economic development. Implementing such integrated strategies will be complex, with likely pushback from officials and private sector groups who benefit from the status quo.

The report identifies various entry-points for equitable, farsighted actions in each of the domains studied and key opportunities to foster inclusive urbanisation. There are vibrant policy networks, start-ups and mobilised civil society actors – such as a flourishing network of grassroots social justice centres – which make Nairobi a fertile ground for innovations and reform coalitions.

We are currently setting up action research projects in Nairobi, using findings from this initial research to inform co-produced interventions that can better address key challenges. These include extending Nairobi County’s school feeding programme to informal settlements, establishing a holistic waste management system in Mathare, improving water and sanitation in Mukuru, and empowering communities with data on land ownership.

By Adewumi Badiora, ACRC Action Research Lead, Lagos

As Africa’s most populous city – with a current population of over 25 million – Lagos is not alone in having a public infrastructure shortfall. When it comes to streetlighting in particular, Lagos has an extreme deficit. Most roads in the city’s residential areas are dark. And where public streetlights have been provided, many are now defunct, while others have begun to go out due to age and poor maintenance.

It has become a huge and increasingly unsustainable challenge to power streetlights in Lagos – either through conventional power generation, linking to the national grid, and/or providing diesel or gas to power them. They are also subject to vandalism. This makes movement at night dangerous in many parts of Lagos, leaving a majority of residents, particularly women and girls, feeling vulnerable and exacerbating their fear of crime.

The situation is even worse in informal settlements. Many of these areas have never been lit, despite the fact they are home to a significant proportion of the city’s population, with over 200 such communities identified in Lagos.

Understanding safety and security in Lagos

The ACRC team conducted safety and security domain research in Lagos to understand local perceptions and experiences of crime and insecurity. This research shows that in the last five years, everyday crime – such as armed robbery, assaults, thefts, cultism and banditry – has been on the increase in Lagos. Most of these crime incidences occur in the night or early morning.

There are several drivers and enablers of crime, including urban design issues – such as the porosity of city boundaries and inadequate provision of infrastructure like streetlighting – as well as an increasing rate of uncompleted and abandoned properties. Findings show that the increasing number of crime hotspots in Lagos was due to the poor nighttime environment.

Streetlight installations therefore seem to offer the potential to deter crime, as well as provide other socioeconomic benefits to the city. The question now is: could streetlights actually prevent crime and contribute to sustainable livelihoods for residents?